VoteVets.org - State of the Military 2008

• I. Introduction
• II. The War in Iraq
  • a. Lack of progress
    • i. Drops in violence: Petraeus and Crocker Negotiated With Iranian
    • ii. Re-Baathification: Faux Political Progress Already Failing
  • b. Quickly adapting enemy
  • c. Problems with overextension continue
• III. The War in Afghanistan
  • a. Loss of control outside of Kabul; Insurgents infiltrate the capital
  • b. Lack of long-term plan and manpower
  • c. Osama bin Laden still free; al Qaeda growing
• IV. Lack of veterans programs, funding
  • a. PTSD: The root cause of drug abuse, suicide, homelessness among veterans still not addressed
  • b. The GI Bill: A promise broken

Part I: Introduction

As the President prepares to deliver his State of the Union address, the largest political group of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans is issuing a State of the Wars, Military and Veterans report. This report is based on the feedback from Iraq and Afghanistan veterans, and those troops still in the field. It paints a very different picture of our broken military and lack of real progress in Iraq and Afghanistan than you will likely hear in the President’s political speech.
For interviews with Iraq and Afghanistan veterans on this report, or the President’s State of the Union, contact eric@votevets.org.

Part II: The War in Iraq

A lack of real progress

There is a real difference between positive temporary indicators and real progress. Troops on the ground, above all else, are aware that much-touted drops in violence do not indicate we are winning in Iraq, nor do they see real long-term progress that puts them on the road home.

Like the capture of Saddam, recent developments certainly aren’t bad, but it is wholly irresponsible for the President or the media to again maintain that they represent progress in Iraq, or are even direct results of the surge of troops.

Drops in violence: Petreaus and Crocker Negotiated With Iranians

The recent drop in violence, in particular, can be primarily attributed to things other than the surge. First and foremost, it can be attributed to General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker going “off the ranch,” trying to cut diplomatic deals with the Iranians, even as the Administration fingers Iran as the largest destabilizing force in Iraq. It has been long known that the Iranians had plied Shia militias in Iraq with weaponry, much of which was used to kill U.S. troops. Rather than threaten Iran, Petraeus talked of trade-offs if Iran stopped inciting sectarian strife. Said Petraeus to one paper, “Honestly, and I really mean this, all of us would really welcome the opportunity to see this, confirm it and even - in whatever way we could - to reciprocate [with the Iranians.]”¹ Those trade-offs could include the release of supposed Iranian Quds forces that the U.S. has detained.

The strongest indication that Petraeus-Crocker team have negotiated happened just recently. Petraeus seemed to offer a carrot to Iran, dispatching his spokesperson to tell a paper on January 3, “We are ready to confirm the excellence of the senior Iranian leadership in their pledge to stop the funding, training, equipment and resourcing of the militia special groups.”² Just hours later, in an interview with FOX News, Petraeus’ office was forced to do a complete 180, saying, “We do not know if there has been a decrease in the supply of Iranian weapons. It is not clear if Iran's leaders stopped supplying weapons or training to extremist elements in Iraq.”³ Clearly the notion that negotiations have led to a drop in violence severely undercuts the case the President wants to make, that it is due to a military surge. The White House pulled on Petraeus’ reins, thus the quick change in stories.

Whatever the case, it is abundantly clear that without prolonged and intense diplomacy, all General Petraeus has been able to work out with the Iranians is a short-term drop in violence. That is a good development, but hardly constitutes progress if it’s not followed through.

Re-Baathification: Faux Political Progress Already Failing

A more recent sign of so-called “progress” is the recent deal to bring Baathists back into the sphere of governance. This, proponents of the Bush strategy say, shows political progress being made.⁴ Yet, the real powerbrokers with the ability to stabilize Iraq are not bureaucratic Baathists in Baghdad, they are Shia clerics in Najaf and emergic Sunni Sheiks in al-Anbar, who have no interest in the central government. Until they are convinced to join the fold, no claims of progress can be made.

While the attempt to bring back Baathists is good, calling it progress is as short-sighted as saying the Kabul government meant real progress across Afghanistan. Prime Minister Karzai’s government is certainly inclusive, but has no stabilizing effect, or shown any ability to combat al Qaeda and the Taliban. The Senlis Council, a think tank in Brussels recently found that insurgents controlled “vast swaths of unchallenged territory" and were gaining "more and more political legitimacy in the minds of the Afghan people.”⁵ Kabul itself, they found, was threatened. That warning became all too clear this week as insurgents launched a deadly suicide bombing at the Hotel Serena, in the heart of “stable” Kabul. Before declaring true progress because marginal players are brought into the Baghdad government, we should take a close look at the lessons of Kabul.

Indeed, just days after the deal was announced to bring ex-Baathists back, the Washington Post reported it was having the opposite effect than intended. The Post quoted one former official, who seemed to represent a growing sentiment, “This is a bomb on the road of reconciliation. This law does not bring anything new. This does not serve national reconciliation that all Iraqis are hoping for. On the contrary, it envisions hostility, hatred, discrimination and sectarian strife.”⁶

That is not progress.

The Sadr Problem

Another contributing factor to the drop in violence is the temporary cease fire called by radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. While his decision to keep his Mahdi Army laying low is a good development, it is unclear, even unlikely, that his reduced activity will continue.

The influence of Muqtada al-Sadr cannot be understated. When he chooses to fight, Americans suffer extremely high casualty rates. When he goes underground, casualties drop. This has very little to do with U.S. troop numbers in Iraq. No matter how much progress we make with other groups, or how many troops we send, we have no real control over the violence in Iraq. Sadr plays violence like a fiddle—and he is the most important figure in Iraq today.

Sadr has shown his ability to inflict huge losses among Americans at his whim. In April, 2004, when he called for an uprising, it was the second deadliest month for American troops at that point.⁷ In April, 2007, again, he was able to unleash the bloodiest summer in Iraq to date⁸, which ended in August, when he called for a ceasefire.

Unfortunately, that six-month ceasefire called by Sadr is due to expire at the end of February. At that point, he will largely decide the fate of Iraq if he is not brought into the fold — something the American forces and Maliki government have not been able to do. One other wildcard of note is the fate of his main Shia “competition,” Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the largest Shia bloc in Parliament. He is receiving cancer treatments, and may not be alive much longer⁹. If he dies, his 35-year old son is set to take control of the bloc. Yet, it also provides an opening for Sadr to launch new rounds of Shia-on-Shia violence, in a bloody power-struggle, which could trigger widespread violence in Iraq, and greater destabilization.

Ultimately this means that peace in Iraq could be determined by an Iraqi thug. If he embraces the political process, we could see a real trend in lowering violence. Should he choose instead to use his militia to attack Sunnis and fight Americans, there is absolutely nothing we can do—as indicated in April, 2004 and throughout the spring and summer of 2007.

There is no doubt that Sadr will continue to maneuver for control of Iraq. Until Sadr is dealt with and mollified (which is largely an Iraqi political problem, not an American military one), real progress cannot be declared.

Quickly Adapting Enemy

One of the most underreported issues is the continuing prowess the enemy shows in adapting to U.S. defenses, and how slow the Administration has been to address these problems.

On Jan 22, the Associated Press reported that one soldier died and three were wounded in a roadside bomb attack.¹⁰ While that in and of itself is news, what was shocking was that the bomb had an effect on the newest Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle. These vehicles were built to protect troops from standard roadside bombs, and had been tested with great results.

Unfortunately, production of these vehicles, and delivery of them to the warzone, was held up because of funding issues. In May, Senator Joe Biden called attention to this issue, discovering that Marines on the ground in Iraq made an urgent request to their commanders for 1,169 mine resistant vehicles as early as February 2005 — but nothing happened.¹¹

While the military says it was trying to produce and deliver MRAPs as quickly as possible, it admitted it was a slow process. Now, it is evident that the delivery of the MRAPs were too slow to deal with a constantly adapting enemy, which has already figured out how to attack them with bigger and more powerful roadside bombs. If the use of a new, more powerful bomb proves to be a widespread tactic, it will necessitate the development of a newer, more protected vehicle.

The President is unlikely to mention this in his State of the Union, but there has been a very real problem staying one step ahead of the enemy, and protecting our troops with the equipment they deserve. Until this issue is addressed, we will continue to put our troops at unneeded risk.

Additionally, the enemy continues to show its prowess in adapting the areas it attacks, moving into areas where we are not, often called the “Amoeba Effect” or “Whack-a-Mole.” While the US has surged in Baghdad, the enemy has focused on the Diyala Province, where there has been a recent explosion of successful attacks, with many casualties.

As the New York Times reported on January 9th, after the attacks in Diyala, the enemy has proven itself adept at predicting troop movements as well, and staying one step ahead of our forces in this game of “Whack-a-Mole”:

With extraordinary secrecy, and even an information blackout aimed at most of their Iraqi Army comrades, American troops began a major offensive on Tuesday to drive Sunni insurgents from strongholds in Diyala Province. But many insurgents still managed to flee the first villages the Americans went into, showing just how difficult it is to trap the elusive militants.”¹²

Problems with overextension continue

Another issue the President is unlikely to address is how, during the last year, the Army reported that repeated and extended deployments have led to the largest spike in troop suicides in more than 20 years.

The Army Suicide Event Report found that “Iraq was the most common deployment location for both (suicides) and attempts” and “there was a significant relationship between suicide attempts and number of days deployed.”¹³

Rather than shock the Administration into action, the White House lobbied hard against, and was able to kill via filibuster, the bi-partisan “Dwell Time Amendment,”¹⁴ offered by Senators Jim Webb and Chuck Hagel, who are both veterans. That legislation would have mandated the long-standing informal rule that troops get as much time on the at home to rest as they spend in the field. While that bill wouldn’t have ended practices to which troops objected, such as involuntary extension, or “stop-loss,” it would have gone a long way toward relieving the overextension that is clearly having a devastating impact on our troops.

Conclusion

None of this is to say that the efforts of troops have been anything less than heroic in Iraq. They have done everything asked of them and are rightfully proud of achieving (accomplishing) every tactical combat mission they’ve been handed. There was never any doubt that our troops would control and secure the terrain that they occupy.

Yet, they know that for all the positive short-term indicators, there is no true progress beneath the surface. As long as the media buys into the argument that there is, and that the military alone can create progress, the troops know that as John McCain said, they will have to be there “a thousand years or a million years.”

Moreover, there has been zero progress in addressing the issues that protect the lives and overextension of our troops, despite indicators and trends that clearly show they are in need of greater protection and relief. It is also true that the surge, while securing areas of Baghdad, has not been able to tamp down violence in other parts of the country, as the enemy continues to attack and then elude American forces. The surge, also, has not convinced the most powerful man in Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr, to fully engage in the political process. 

Until true progress is made in Iraq that allows our troops to come home, and we address the burden we are placing on our all-volunteer force, the long-term prognosis for our military is bleak.

Part III: The War in Afghanistan

Loss of control outside of Kabul; Insurgents infiltrate the capital

While the war in Iraq is a top concern among the military, the lack of progress in Afghanistan – indeed steps backwards and even regression of past successes– frustrates many of the troops.

Those feelings were corroborated by the non-partisan Senlis Council in its report, “Afghanistan on the Brink.” The far-reaching report concluded the lack of progress in Afghanistan has reached “crisis proportions,” stating:

The insurgency now controls vast swaths of unchallenged territory including rural areas, some district centres, and important road arteries. The Taliban are the de facto governing authority in significant portions of territory in the south, and are starting to control parts of the local economy and key infrastructure such as roads and energy supply. The insurgency also exercises a significant amount of psychological control, gaining more and more political legitimacy in the minds of the Afghan people who have a long history of shifting alliances and regime change.

The depressing conclusion is that, despite the vast injections of international capital flowing into the country, and a universal desire to ‘succeed’ in Afghanistan, the state is once again in serious danger of falling into the hands of the Taliban.¹⁵

The report goes on to say that there are simply not enough ground forces to hold important areas of Afghanistan, allowing al Qaeda and its allies to move into Kabul – the final front in their recapture of Afghanistan.

These fears were demonstrated to be well-grounded when terrorists successfully conducted a bombing of the Hotel Serena early this year, in the most heavily fortified area of the capital.¹⁶

Lack of long-term plan and manpower

As the Senlis Council report suggests, many of the problems in Afghanistan can be attributed to the lack of forces that the US has dedicated to fighting al Qaeda and the nation’s inability to convince international partners to send more troops.

Though the council recommends doubling forces to 80,000, the White House would only commit 3,200 more Marines¹⁷ to fight al Qaeda and hold on to Afghanistan, which is quickly slipping away. While the President may try to explain this as a “surge” in Afghanistan, in reality, these troops only replace the shrinking NATO forces, resulting in no net increase of forces.¹⁸ Unfortunately, the Bush Administration has garnered a great deal of international ill-will because of Iraq, and has shown a lack of seriousness about Afghanistan. Combined, these have led to problems convincing our international allies to increase their force levels in Afghanistan. Our increase in forces merely compensates for the loss of our allies – it is not an overall increase in troops.

Frustration among troops with the lack of commitment to Afghanistan has boiled over. One troop in Afghanistan, upon hearing the news, blogged, “Awesome! So here in the GWOT where we have been fighting for over six years now, we're getting 16% of what was sent to Iraq this time last year. Nice.” ¹⁹

The lack of manpower and uncertainty as to when troops may be transitioned out of the war with in Iraq has left the nation with no long-term plan for Afghanistan. Clearly the United States cannot accomplish what must be done. Once, it was hoped that President Musharraf in Pakistan could provide significant help, but it has largely been accepted that he is unwilling to help, or unable, due to his own political problems, at home.

Osama bin Laden still free; al Qaeda growing

The President also won’t mention the resurgence of al Qaeda’s strength and infrastructure, under the guidance of Osama bin Laden, who is still alive seven years after the invasion.

It was our own intelligence in the past year that warned al Qaeda was strongest and most active in Afghanistan and Pakistan, not Iraq.

The National Intelligence Estimate, which the President will not address directly, reported al Qaeda “has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability” and has been able "to recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland attacks.”²⁰

Conclusion

Afghanistan has correctly been described as having deteriorated into a “crisis.” The Bush Administration, by refusing to reallocate forces to fight what the National Intelligence Estimate says is a top threat to America, has allowed al Qaeda to regenerate and begin to plan for a new round of attacks on our shores.

At the same time, the Bush Administration has effectively “waved the white flag” and allowed the Taliban to reassert itself as a controlling force across more than half of Afghanistan, bringing them many steps closer to taking the capital. 

Again, this is not to assert that troops have not done all that’s been asked of them. But clearly, troops in Afghanistan are frustrated and alarmed by how little seriousness the Administration has paid to the crisis in Afghanistan.

Part IV: Lack of veterans programs, funding

One area the President may touch upon in his State of the Union is the state of veterans care in the nation, especially since the past year saw the embarrassment of the Walter Reed fiasco. Yet, the problems are far and deep, and it is unlikely that the President will adequately address the issues below.

PTSD: The root cause of drug abuse, suicide, homelessness among veterans still not addressed

In November, the Journal of the American Medical Association reported that Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) among returning veterans was significantly higher than past estimates. It wrote that because PTSD often has a significant gestation period, mental health screenings of returning troops “substantially underestimate the mental health burden.”²¹

The study was particularly harsh on the system of screening and care for those troops who return with PTSD, saying the military does not have a system of care that takes care of troops "before symptoms become chronically entrenched." Even the care that is offered, it found, is ineffectual because of the "overburdened" military medical system, and finding "no direct relationship of referral or treatment with symptom improvement."

The Washington Post, writing on the report, noted, “While reports of mental health problems rose for all types of soldiers from the first screening to the second one, the National Guard and Reserve soldiers suffered such problems at higher rates than active-duty troops. In the second screening, 24.5 percent of reservists reported concerns with PTSD, 13 percent with depression and 35.5 percent with their overall mental health risk -- compared with 16.7 percent, 10.3 percent and 27.1 percent of active-duty soldiers in the same categories.”²²

PTSD has been linked to disturbing rates of homelessness, drug abuse, suicide, and even homicide among veterans.

The Department of Veterans Affairs estimates that there are 1,500 homeless Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans, out of the nearly 200,000 homeless veterans overall. In the Associated Press, Pete Dougherty, director of homeless veterans programs at the VA, commented that homeless Iraq veterans are more likely to have a mental illness, and the VA reported that “45 percent of participants in the VA's homeless programs have a diagnosable mental illness.”²³

As detailed before, suicide rates in the Army are at more than a 20-year high, with multiple and extended deployments directly linked to the stress that causes troops and veterans to take their own lives.

The New York Times reported that Iraq and Afghanistan veterans had been linked to 121 homicides across the United States, with many experts linking the relationship between PTSD and bouts of violence.²⁴

Increased funding for the VA and related veteran care programs would go a long way towards identifying and caring for those veterans with mental injuries and ensuring that they get the disability payments they are due. And yet, the Administration is still fighting over every dime Congress proposes on spending for veterans.

The process of screening, monitoring, and treating PTSD must also be addressed. Our veterans report extremely high hurdles in getting treatment for PTSD, often having to fight for a “full” PTSD diagnosis, which would allow for them to get treatment and disability payments.

Some veterans report that even initial screening for mental injuries is flawed. Returning troops are required to fill out a questionnaire upon their return, with the caveat that they will only be able to immediately rejoin their families if they report no mental trauma, leading many, if not most troops, to deny any mental trauma on their forms.

Going into 2008, it is clear very little attention has been paid to PTSD by the Administration, and it is unlikely that the President will adequately address it in his State of the Union.

The GI Bill: A promise broken

Studies have shown that 90 percent of enlisted personnel do not have a higher education.²⁵ And while this generation of troops has served longer and with more deployments than ever, the education benefits given to them are severely lacking.

Many people are surprised to learn that the G.I. Bill, which once guaranteed a cost-free education to all veterans, now does anything but that.

The Fund for Veterans Education reports that the maximum available amount of educational aid given to returning troops over a four-year period is $39,636. Yet, the average cost of a public college for an in-state student is $65,428; for an out-of-state student is $105,216; and a private college costs $133,204.²⁶

It is a national disgrace that the G.I. Bill, once the crown jewel of veterans’ benefits, has been allowed to become tarnished, cracked and ineffective. We should settle for nothing less than restoring the promise of a higher education for all our veterans.

The President will not address this, but there is a piece of legislation being drafted by Senators Jim Webb and Chuck Hagel which would restore the promise of the G.I. Bill. The Iraq and Afghanistan veterans of VoteVets.org wholeheartedly endorse this plan.

Conclusion

This President showed great urgency in sending our troops to war, but has been lackadaisical, at best, when it comes to taking care of them when they come home.

The past year has seen disturbing trends in the amount of troops returning with PTSD, becoming homeless, and even committing suicide. Additionally, for the ones who return and wish to better their lives (and America) by getting a higher education, this Administration has allowed the door to be closed in their faces.

The state of troop and veteran’s care is dismal.

¹ http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/10/01/wshia101.xml
² http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080103/NATION/498097125/1001
³ http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,319969,00.html
⁴ http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/15/africa/iraq.php
⁵ http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/Afghanistan_on_the_brink
⁶ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/22/AR2008012203538_pf.html
⁷ http://www.kaptur.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=70&Itemid=51
⁸ http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf
⁹ http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/30C7722A-606F-4B94-8F62-EB19FD75E5FA.htm
¹⁰ http://www.azstarnet.com/news/221773
¹¹ http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/05/marine_biden_mrap_070524/
¹² http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/09/world/middleeast/09diyala.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
¹³ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/15/AR2007081502443.html?tid=informbox
¹⁴ http://thinkprogress.org/2007/09/19/breaking-webb-amendment-fails/
¹⁵ http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/Afghanistan_on_the_brink
¹⁶ http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/01/15/asia/AS-GEN-Afghan-Hotel-Explosion.php
¹⁷ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/14/AR2008011402043.html
¹⁸ http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,160062,00.html
¹⁹ http://www.vetvoice.com/showDiary.do?diaryId=385
²⁰ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/17/AR2007071702007.html
²¹ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/13/AR2007111301459_pf.html²² IBID
²³ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20071107/homeless-veterans/
²⁴ http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/us/13vets.html
²⁵ http://www.veteransfund.org/factsheet.pdf
²⁶ IBID

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